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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DANIEL BERNARD STONE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43444
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-17534
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, a jury found twenty-six-year-old Daniel Bernard Stone guilty
of felony grand theft by possession of stolen property. The district court imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Stone asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Boise Police Department officers received information about a possible stolen RV
at a RV park, and that Mr. Stone and his brother, Neeko Stone, were possible suspects.

1

(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1 Officer Evans noticed an Airstream RV in
the park, and the park manager stated her records showed it belonged to Neeko Stone.
(PSI, p.3.) The RV’s plates did not return to the Airstream RV. (PSI, p.3.) While the
police confirmed the VIN on the stolen RV with the Airstream dealership that had
reported the theft, Mr. Stone and his brother arrived at the scene. (PSI, p.3.) They
were detained and transported for interviews. (PSI, p.3.) Officers opened the RV and
found stolen property inside. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Stone stated that he was homeless, having been recently kicked out of his
parent’s place for using drugs and not getting a job. (PSI, p.3.) He stated that the RV
belonged to “Nick,” who Mr. Stone had met at a bar. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Stone initially
denied his brother had been at the RV before changing his story, and denied knowing
any of the property had been stolen. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Stone’s brother stated he and Mr. Stone had been living at the RV for the
past week-and-a-half, and the RV belonged to “Russ.” (PSI, p.3.) He stated he and
Mr. Stone found the RV park and coordinated with Russ to park the RV there. (PSI,
pp.3-4.) The brother denied knowing any of the property had been stolen. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Stone then stated the owner of the RV was one Nicholas Russell, and admitted to
living in the RV for the past week-and-a-half. (PSI, p.4.)
The State charged Mr. Stone by Information with one count of grand theft by
possession of stolen property, felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(4), 182407(1), 18-2409 and 18-204. (R., pp.46-47.)

Mr. Stone entered a not guilty plea.

All citations to the Presentence Report refer to the 277-page PDF version,
including attachments.
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(R., p.50.)

Following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Stone guilty of grand theft by

possession of stolen property. (R., pp.75-82, 131.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed.

(R., p.132.)

Mr. Stone

recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, have him screened for drug court,2 or,
if the district court imposed sentence, impose a unified sentence of seven years, with
one year fixed. (R., p.132.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with two years fixed. (R., pp.132-37.)
Mr. Stone filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.141-45.)
Mr. Stone also filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
(R., pp.149-50.)

The district court denied the motion.

(R., p.160.)

On appeal,

Mr. Stone does not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider
sentence.3

The State suggested Mr. Stone was not eligible for drug court because he was facing
a separate felony crime of violence charge for aggravated battery at the time. (See
Tr., June 18, 2015, p.146, Ls.16-22; PSI, pp.10-11.)
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Id.
2

3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Stone following his conviction for grand theft by
possession of stolen property?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Stone Following His Conviction For Grand
Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property
Mr. Stone asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, because his sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.

The district court should have instead followed

Mr. Stone’s recommendations by retaining jurisdiction or imposing a lesser sentence.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving “due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Stone does not assert that his sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Stone
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
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wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . .
consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.”

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Stone submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider his substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence
to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Stone reported
he had used alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, synthetic
cannabinoids, and prescription medications. (PSI, pp.14-15.) He stated that marijuana
was his drug of choice, that he smoked marijuana almost every day, and that he felt he
had a problem with his use of drugs. (PSI, p.15.) In his GAIN-I Recommendation and
Referral Summary (GRRS), Mr. Stone, based on his self-reported symptoms, was
diagnosed with alcohol abuse, amphetamine abuse, and cannabis abuse. (PSI, pp.15859.)
The GRRS recommended Level 1 outpatient treatment for Mr. Stone.

(PSI,

p.165.) While the GRRS indicated that Mr. Stone’s responses indicated no or minimal
motivation for treatment, Mr. Stone reported he was “about 100% ready to remain
abstinent.” (PSI, p.162.)

During the presentence investigation, Mr. Stone wrote, “[a]t

this time I have desire to use any drugs.

I am determined to maintain full time

employment and to raise my daughter.” (PSI, p.15.)
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The district court also did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Stone’s difficult
early childhood. During the presentence investigation, Mr. Stone reported he did not
have many memories from when he was under eight years old, outside remembering a
lot of foster homes and moving around. (PSI, p.12.) After he was adopted, he had a
good family. (PSI, p.12.) However, Mr. Stone’s GRRS noted that, while he did not
report any past sexual abuse, information provided in a previous presentence report
indicated Mr. Stone was molested as a child. (See PSI, p.164.)
The previous presentence report stated that Mr. Stone was born in Washington
State and raised by parents who abused drugs and alcohol. (PSI, p.251.) Mr. Stone
was then placed in foster care at the age of four or five, and remained in foster care until
his adoption when he was eight-and-one-half years old. (PSI, p.251.) Mr. Stone’s
adoptive father stated that Mr. Stone had been molested as a child and never knew his
biological father.

(See PSI, p.251.)

Mr. Stone’s adoptive father further reported

Mr. Stone had been adopted because his biological mother was unable to care for him.
(See PSI, p.251.) Mr. Stone’s biological mother once drugged Mr. Stone to make him
appear mentally and physically handicapped in an attempt to obtain money for his care.
(See PSI, p.251.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel asserted that “while
[Mr. Stone] indicated in his PSI he had a good life with his adoptive parents, I think you
can tell from prior things there may have been some other trauma in his life, some other
biological factors that may have led to his drug addiction and criminal thinking . . . .”
(Tr., June 18, 2015, p.145, Ls.15-20.)
Further, the district court did not adequately consider how Mr. Stone’s age made
him more amenable to treatment and programming. About seven years before the
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instant offense, when Mr. Stone was eighteen years old, he was convicted of felony
burglary. (See PSI, pp.5-6, 10.) During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel
discussed what happened next:
So what we did is took an 18-year-old kid. He tried on probation and
didn’t do well. He was sent on a rider. He did a rider. He did well enough
on the rider to be reinstated on probation and then he continued to have
issues. He eventually was sent to the prison. Did the therapeutic
community still at a very young age before theoretically his brain was fully
developed. And ended up after some parole violations topping out
his sentence.
(Tr., June 18, 2015, p.142, L.22 – p.143, L.6; see PSI, pp.10-11.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel explained that “Judge Copsey will
tell you in her courtroom repeatedly that a male brain typically does not fully develop
until they are about 25.” (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.142, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Stone’s counsel
asserted, “I think [Mr.] Stone is at an age now where a rider would do him some good
because he would get some programming with what is most likely as close to a fully
formed brain as he is going to get.” (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.143, L.22 – p.144, L.1.)
According to Mr. Stone’s counsel, “[w]hen [Mr. Stone] was 18, he wasn’t ready for any
of that programming but I believe he is ready now. And I believe he needs it if we want
to get him on the right track.” (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.144, Ls.2-5.)
The district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors. Thus,
Mr. Stone asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, because his sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Stone respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded
to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 25th day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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